Generalized signcryption can adaptively work as an encryption scheme, a signature scheme, or a signcryption scheme with only one algorithm. The paper proposes an efficient certificateless generic signcryption scheme without utilizing bilinear pairing operations. It is proved to satisfy confidentiality and unforgeability against chosen ciphertext and message attacks in an adaptive manner, respectively, in the random oracle model. Due to the lower computational cost and communication overhead, the proposed scheme is suitable for low power and processor devices.
Introduction
In the traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), a certificate authority (CA) which is a third party issues the certificates to bind the identity of a user and the corresponding public key. The certificate provides an unforgeable and trusted link by CA's digital signature. However, the problem of certificate management, including the storage, revocation, and distribution of certificates, is complex in this kind of PKI. Identitybased Public Key Cryptosystems (ID-PKC) were introduced by Shamir [1] in 1984 to simplify certificate management problem. A user's public key can be easily derived from arbitrary strings corresponding to his identity information, such as passport number, telephone number, name, and email address. A trusted third party named private key generator (PKG) computes private keys from a master secret and users' identity information and distributes these private keys to users participating in the scheme. This eliminates the need for certificates as used in a traditional PKI. ID-based systems may be a good alternative for certificate-based systems from the viewpoint of efficiency and convenience. But an inherent problem of ID-based cryptosystems is the key escrow; that is, the PKG knows the user's private key, resulting in no user privacy and authenticity. To eliminate these problems simultaneously, Al-Riyami and Paterson introduced the concept of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) in 2003 [2] .
In a CL-PKC, a public/secret key pair is produced by the user himself independently without requiring the public key to be certified. Also, a partial private key is generated by a semitrusted third party, called the key generation center (KGC), from the unique identifier information of the user. Knowing only one of them should not be able to impersonate the user and carry out any of the cryptographic operations as the user. In other words, CL-PKC can act as an intermediate between traditional PKI and ID-PKC.
The confidentiality and authenticity of messages are the basic requirement for secure communication. In 1997, Zheng proposed a cryptographic primitive signcryption [3] , which simultaneously fulfils the integrated function of public encryption and digital signature with a computing and communication cost significantly smaller than that required by the signature-then-encryption method. According to the three public key authentication methods, signcryption can be divided into three types: PKI-based signcryption schemes [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] , ID-based signcryption schemes (IBSC) [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] , and certificateless signcryption schemes (CLSC) [17] [18] [19] [20] .
Sometimes, confidentiality and authenticity are needed separately, and sometimes, both of them are needed simultaneously. We can use encryption, signature, or signcryption to achieve the security properties, respectively. But maintaining three different primitives or components at the same time is quite a burden to a system, especially to the low power and processor devices in low-bandwidth environments. Generalized signcryption (GSC) was proposed [21] [22] [23] to solve this problem. GSC scheme can adaptively work as encryption scheme, signature scheme, or signcryption scheme with only one algorithm. In other words, without any additional modification and computation, it provides double functions when confidentiality and authenticity are required simultaneously and the separate encryption or signature function when one of them is required. So, the GSC scheme can be viewed as a primitive with three work modes. In 2010, the first certificateless generalized signcryption (CLGSC) scheme was introduced by Ji et al. [24] . In their work, the formal definition, security model, and a concrete scheme were proposed. But Kushwah and Lai [25] noted that the scheme [24] is not existentially unforgeable against Type I adversary, and they proposed a new secure and efficient CLGSC scheme. Zhou et al. [26] proposed a more efficient CLGSC scheme based on the certificateless signcryption proposed in [17] . However, all the existing CLGSC schemes are realized with bilinear pairing operations. Compared with other operations, the bilinear pairing operation is much more complicated. Therefore, a concrete scheme without bilinear pairing is more suitable for applications. Very recently, Zhou et al. [27] introduced the key-insulated mechanism into GSC and propose a concrete scheme without bilinear pairings in the certificateless cryptosystem setting.
In this paper, we give a formal definition and the security concept of CLGSC and propose an efficient concrete scheme without utilizing bilinear pairing operations based on a certificateless signcryption-tag key encapsulation mechanism [28] . The concrete scheme is proved to satisfy confidentiality and unforgeability against chosen ciphertext and message attacks in an adaptive manner, respectively, in the random oracle model. Due to less computational cost and communication overhead, the proposed scheme is suitable for low power and processor devices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The security problems, complexity assumptions, and the formal model of CLGSC scheme are introduced in Section 2. We describe a new CLGSC scheme in Section 3 and give the security proof and performance analysis of the new scheme in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, the conclusions are given in Section 6.
Preliminaries

Security Problems and Complexity Assumptions.
Several related mathematical hard problems and security assumptions are presented here.
(i) The Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem (ECDLP) [29] : for group which is generated by ∈ , given ∈ , to find ∈ Z * such that = .
Definition 1 (ECDLP assumption). For group which is generated by ∈ , given ∈ , the successful advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A is presented as Adv
If there exists no PPT adversary A with nonnegligible advantage in solving the ECDLP problem, we say that the ECDLP assumption holds.
(ii) One-sided Gap Diffie-Hellman problem (ECDLP) [30] : for group which is generated by ∈ , = is a fixed point, given = , to find with the help of a onesided decision Diffie-Hellman (ODDH) oracle. The ODDH oracle gets the tuple ( , , , ) as the input and outputs 1 if = (mod ) and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2 (ECDLP assumption). For group
which is generated by ∈ , = is a fixed point, given = . The successful advantage of any PPT adversary A is presented as Adv (1) Setup. Take a security parameter as input, KGC runs Setup algorithm to generate common parameters params and a master key msk. params are publicly available, whereas the msk is kept by the KGC secretly. Formally, we can write
(2) Set-User-Key. Take the common parameters params and the identity information of himself as input; each user runs Set-User-Key algorithm to generate a secure value and the corresponding public key value for himself. It returns the user's secret value and a corresponding public value PV. Formally, we can write 
(4) Set-Private-Key. Given the common parameters params, the partial private key , and the secret value , the user with identity ID runs this algorithm to generate the full private key SK for himself. Formally, we can write
(5) Set-Public-Key. Given the common parameters params, the partial private key , the secret value , and the public value PV, the user with identity ID runs this algorithm to generate the full public key PK as the output. Formally, we can write
(6) CLGSC-Signcrypt. Given the common parameters params, the message , the receiver's identity , and the full public value , the user with identity and the full private key runs this algorithm to generate the ciphertext as the output. Note that and could be null string. Formally, we can write 
CLGSC-Signcrypt Queries.
A submits ( , , ) to C, in which is a message and and are the sender's and the receiver's identities, respectively. C returns the ciphertext to A. Note that if the public key of the sender has been replaced, then C may not return the ciphertext . In this case, A must provide the secret value to C.
CLGSC-Unsigncrypt Queries.
A submits ( , , ) to C, in which is a signature or signcryption ciphertext and and are the sender's and the receiver's identities, respectively. C returns the output of CLGSC-unsigncrypt to A. Note that if the public key of the receiver is replaced, then C may not return the corresponding value. In this case, A must provide the secret value to C.
Confidentiality Definition 3 (IND-CLGSC-CCA2 confidentiality)
. A certificateless generic signcryption scheme in signcryption mode or encryption mode is semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks if, for all PPT adversary, the advantage is negligible in the following games. The games are played between a challenger C and the adversaries A and A , respectively.
GAME 1 (IND-CLGSC-CCA2-I)
Initial. C generates the system parameters params and the master secret key msk by running the Setup algorithm. It keeps msk secret and sends params to A .
Phase I.
A performs a polynomially bounded number of the above queries.
, in which 0 and 1 are distinct messages of equal length and and are the sender's and the receiver's identities, respectively. Here, it is to be noted that 's full private key has not been extracted by A in Phase I. It is also to be noted that 's partial private key has not been extracted and his public key has not been replaced simultaneously. C picks ∈ {0, 1} randomly, runs the algorithm of CLGSC-signcrypt with ( , , ), and sends the output to A .
Phase II. A asks queries adaptively again. However, the full private key for may not be extracted by A and the partial private key for may not be extracted if the public key of has been replaced in Phase I. Only after the public key or has been replaced, CLGSC-unsigncrypt query on with sender and receiver is allowed.
Guess Stage.
A outputs his guess and if = he wins the game.
GAME 2 (IND-CLGSC-CCA2-II)
Initial. C generates params and msk by running the Setup algorithm. It sends params and msk to A .
Phase I.
A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries just as A in IND-CLGSC-CCA2-I game. ExtractPartial-Private-Key queries are not included here, because A knows , and he can generate users' partial private keys by himself.
Challenge. At the end of Phase I, A outputs a tuple
, in which 0 and 1 are distinct messages of equal length and and are the sender's and the receiver's identities, respectively. Here, it is to be noted that A must have made no Set-Private-Key queries on in Phase I. C picks ∈ {0, 1} randomly, runs the algorithm of CLGSC-signcrypt with ( , , ), and sends the output to A .
Phase II. A asks queries adaptively again. However, the full private key for may not be extracted and only after the public key or has been replaced, CLGSCunsigncrypt query on with sender and receiver is allowed.
Guess Stage.
The advantage of A is V
Note that, in the above games, only the signcryption mode and encryption mode of the CLGSC scheme must be considered. The receiver's identity cannot be vacant. If the sender's identity is not vacant, the algorithm runs in signcryption mode; otherwise it runs in encryption mode.
Unforgeability
Definition 4 (EUF-CLGSC-CMA unforgeability). A certificateless generic signcryption scheme in signature mode or signcryption mode is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks if, for all PPT adversary, the advantage is negligible in the following games. The games are played between a challenger C and the adversaries F and F , respectively.
GAME 3 (EUF-CLGSC-CMA-)
Initial. C generates params and msk by running the Setup algorithm. It keeps msk secret and sends params to F . Note that, in the above games, only the signcryption mode and signature mode of the CLGSC scheme must be considered. The sender's identity cannot be vacant. If the receiver's identity is not vacant, the algorithm runs in signcryption mode; otherwise it runs in signature mode.
The Concrete Scheme
Motivated by the pairing-free CLSC-TKEM protocol, in this section, we present a novel certificateless generalized signcryption scheme. It consists of seven algorithms.
(1) Setup. Given a security parameters ∈ Z + , the KGC executes the following operations: (i) It chooses a -bits prime and the tuple { , / , , }, where is generated by .
(ii) It chooses ∈ Z * uniformly as the master key and computes = ⋅ .
(iii) Let 0 , 1 , 2 be cryptography hash functions, where (v) The public parameters and functions are presented as = { , / , , , , 0 , 1 , 2 }.
(2) Set-User-Key. A user U with the identity randomly chooses ∈ Z * as its secret value and computes the corresponding public value as = ⋅ . (ii) It computes
is the partial private key of U. U can accept as a valid partial private key by determining if
(4) Set-Private-Key. The user U takes the pair ( , ) as its full private key .
(5) Set-Public-Key. The user U takes the pair ( , ) as its full public key .
(6) CLGSC-Signcrypt. With the message and the receiver's identity , the sender A performs as follows:
(i) It chooses ∈ Z * randomly and computes = ⋅ .
(ii) It computes ( ), ( ).
(v) It sets = ( , , ) and returns ( , , ) as the ciphertext. (ii) It computes = ⊕ ( 1 ( , , , ) ⋅ ( )), where = ⋅ ( + ). , , ) ). If the equation does not hold, then return ⊥ indicating the message is not valid. Otherwise, return true when ( ) = 0 indicating it is a valid signature of user A or indicating it is a valid encryption/signcryption ciphertext of the message sent to user B.
Correctness of the Scheme. The correctness of the proposed concrete scheme is proved as follows.
(i) Correctness of the Encryption
, ,
(8)
(ii) Correctness of the Signature
Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
In this section, the security of the proposed concrete CLGSC scheme is proved as follows. 
Confidentiality
Proof. Given an instance of the ECDLP problem, for group generated by and a fixed second point (= ) having as input (= ) ∈ , C has to compute for the point (= ) ∈ such that = (mod ) with the help of a ODDH oracle. Suppose the IND-CLGSC-CCA2-security of the CLGSC can be violated by a Type adversary A . C can utilize A to compute as the solution to this instance by the following interactive game.
C chooses ∈ Z * uniformly as the master key and computes = ⋅ . It sends params to A and maintains lists (0 ≤ ≤ 2) to keep the consistency between the responses to the hash queries and a list of issued keys which are initially empty. C selects randomly, where 1 ≤ ≤ 0 , and takes as the target identity. C chooses , ∈ Z * and sets 0 ( , , ) = − , = + − , and = . C inserts ( , , , − ) into the list 0 and ( , ⊥, , , ) into the list . C answers A 's queries to random oracles (0 ≤ ≤ 2) as follows. / , ℎ ) exists in 2 , C returns ℎ . Otherwise, C chooses ℎ ∈ Z * and returns ℎ to A . Then C inserts ( , , , , / , ℎ ) into 2 . C can answer A 's other queries as follows.
Phase I (i) Set-User-Key Queries.
A requests a secret value of the user with . If the public key of has not been replaced, then C responds with by retrieving from the list .
(ii) Extract-Partial-Private-Key Queries. A requests the partial private key of a user with . If = , C aborts the execution. Otherwise, C checks in , and if ( , , , , ) exists, C returns . Otherwise, C computes the partial private key of by using the actual Extract-Partial-Private-Key algorithm, and C inserts ( , , , , ) into the list and returns .
(iii) Set-Private-Key Queries. A requests a user's full private key with . C aborts the execution when = . Otherwise, C checks in , and if ( , , , , ) exists, C returns the corresponding private key ( , ). Otherwise, C picks , , ∈ Z * , then sets 0 ( , , ) = − , = + , and computes = ⋅ = and it satisfies the equation = + 0 ( , , ) . C returns ( , ) to A and inserts ( , , , − ) into the list 0 and ( , , , , ) into .
(iv) Set-Public-Key Queries.
A requests a user's public key with . C checks in , and if ( , , , , ) exists, C returns the corresponding public key ( , ). Otherwise, C picks , , ∈ Z * , then sets 0 ( , , ) = − , = + , and computes the public key as = ⋅ = and it satisfies the equation = + 0 ( , , 
, , , , ) = ℎ , 2 ( , , , , ) = ℎ , and adds the tuples ( , , , , , ℎ ) and ( , , , , , ℎ ) to the list 2 in which , ℎ , ℎ ∈ Z * . C computes = 1 ( , , , ) ⋅ ( ) ⊕ and = ⋅ ℎ + ⋅ ℎ − . C outputs ( , , = ( , , )) as the ciphertext.
The tuple ( , , = ( , , )) can pass the verification as the valid ciphertext because the equality holds as follows:
, C obtains the receiver's private key and returns the output of CLGSC-unsigncrypt algorithm to A . Note that if the receiver's public value is replaced, C may not obtain the receiver's secret value. In this case, receiver's secret value is requested to be provided by A. Otherwise, C searches in 2 for ( , , , , , ℎ ) and ( , , , , , ℎ ). If the entries exist and the equality ⋅ = + 0 ( , , ) ⋅ + ⋅ ℎ + ⋅ ℎ holds, is retrieved. If C can find a tuple ( , , , , ) in 1 making the ODDH oracle return 1 when queries are on ( , , ), then the message is ⊕ .
Challenge.
A submits ( 0 , 1 , * , * ) in which 0 and 1 are distinct messages of equal length and * and * are the sender's and the receiver's identities, respectively. Here, it is to be noted that A must have made no Set-Private-Key queries on * in Phase I. It is also to be noted that * 's partial private key has not been extracted and his public key has not been replaced simultaneously. C aborts the game if * ̸ = . Otherwise, C generates the challenge ciphertext as follows.
(1) It sets * = and chooses * ∈ .
(2) It selects randomly a bit ∈ {0, 1} and a random hash value ℎ and sets * = ⊕ ℎ. In the above challenge query, the senders and * can be 0 for the encryption mode; otherwise, it works as signcryption. Thus, the proof is suitable for the two modes.
Analysis. Lets 1 , 2 , and 3 be the events when C aborts this game. 
Lemma 7. If A has nonnegligible advantage against the IND-CLGSC-CCA2-II security of our scheme and performing
V Extract-Secret-Value queries, Set-Private-Key queries, and queries to oracles ( = 0, 1, 2), then there is an algorithm that solves the ECDLP problem with probability
Proof. Given an instance of the ECDLP problem, for group generated by and a fixed second point (= ) having as input (= ) ∈ , C has to compute for the point (= ) ∈ such that = (mod ) with the help of a ODDH oracle. Suppose the IND-CLGSC-CCA2-II security of the CLGSC can be violated by a Type II adversary A . C can utilize A to compute as the solution to this instance by the following interactive game.
C chooses ∈ Z * uniformly as the master key and computes = ⋅ . C sends params and to A and maintains lists (0 ≤ ≤ 2) to avoid the inconsistency between the responses to the hash queries and a list of issued keys which is initially empty. C selects randomly, where 1 ≤ ≤ 0 , and fixes as the target identity. C chooses , ∈ Z * , sets 0 ( , , ) = , and computes = , = + ⋅ , and the public key as = . C inserts ( , , , ) into the list 0 and ( , , ⊥ , , ) into the list . (ii) Set-Private-Key Queries. A produces to C and requests a user's private key with . If = , C aborts. Otherwise, C checks for a tuple ( , , , , ) in . If it exists, C returns ( , ). Otherwise, C chooses , , ∈ Z * , then sets 0 ( , , ) = , and computes = , = + ⋅ , and = . C inserts ( , , , ) into the list 0 and ( , , , , ) into the list and returns ( , ).
(iii) Set-Public-Key Queries. A requests a user's public key with . C checks for a tuple ( , , , , ). If it exists, C returns the corresponding public key ( , ). Otherwise, C chooses , , ∈ Z * , then sets 0 ( , , ) = , and computes = , = + ⋅ , and the public key as = . C inserts ( , , , ) into the list 0 and ( , , , , ) into the list and returns ( , ). The tuple ( , , = ( , , )) can pass the verification as the valid ciphertext because the equality holds as follows:
, C obtains the receiver's private key, runs the CLGSC-unsigncrypt algorithm, and returns the output of CLGSC-unsigncrypt to A . Otherwise, C searches in 2 for ( , , , , , ℎ ) and ( , , , , , ℎ ). If the entries exist and the equality ⋅ = + 0 ( , , )⋅ + ⋅ ℎ + ⋅ ℎ holds, is retrieved. If C can find a tuple ( , , , , ) in 1 making the ODDH oracle return 1 when queries are on ( , , ), then the message is ⊕ .
Challenge.
A submits ( 0 , 1 , * , * ) in which 0 and 1 are distinct messages of equal length and * and * are the sender's and the receiver's identities, respectively. Here, it is to be noted that A must have made no Set-Private-Key queries on * in Phase I. C aborts the game if * ̸ = . Otherwise, C generates the challenge ciphertext as follows.
(1) It sets * = , where is given in the instance of the ECDLP problem and computes
(2) It selects randomly a bit ∈ {0, 1} and ℎ as a random hash value and sets * = ⊕ ℎ. In the above challenge query, the senders and * can be 0 for the encryption mode; otherwise, it works as signcryption. Thus, the proof is suitable for the two modes.
Analysis. In order to assess the probability of success of the challenger, C lets 1 , 2 , and 3 be the events in which C aborts the IND-CLGSC-CCA2-II game.
(i) 1 is an event in which A asks to query the secret value of the target identity . The probability of 1 is Pr
(ii) 2 is an event in which A asks to query the private key of the target identity . The probability of 2 is Pr 3 is an event in which the target identity has not been chosen as the receiver by A during the challenge. The probability of 3 is Pr 
Unforgeability
Proof. Given an instance of the ECDLP problem ( , ) ∈ , C must find . Suppose the EUF-CLGSC-CMA-I security of the CLGSC can be violated by a forger F . C can utilize F to compute as the solution by the following interactive game. C chooses ∈ Z * uniformly as the master key and computes = ; it sends params to F and maintains lists (0 ≤ ≤ 2) to keep consistency between the responses to the hash queries and a list of issued keys which is initially empty.
Training Phase. F may make a series of queries and all of the queries are responded to identically as those queries in the IND-CLGSC-CCA2-I game.
Forgery. F returns a valid ciphertext from the sender to the receiver . If ̸ = , C aborts the execution of this game. We are ready to apply the forking lemma [31] that essentially says the following: consider the concrete scheme producing signatures ( , , ℎ, ) or signcryption ciphertexts of the form ( , , ℎ, ) , where each of , ℎ, corresponds to one of the three moves of a honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocol. If F is a sufficiently efficient forger in the above Security and Communication Networks 9 interaction and forges a signature or signcryption ciphertext ( , , ) in a time with probability ⩾ 10( +1)( + ℎ )/2 ( being a security parameter so that ℎ is uniformly taken from a set of 2 elements) when making CLGSC-signcrypt queries and ℎ random oracle calls and if the triples ( , ℎ, ) can be simulated without knowing the private key, then there exists a Turing machine that uses F to produce two valid ciphertexts ( * , , * ) and ( * , * , * ) on the same message , in expected time ⩽ 120686 ℎ / . Thus, we can get ⋅ = − ⋅ + ℎ ⋅ + ℎ ⋅ and
We can obtain the following value.
Therefore, C solve the ECDLP as = ( − * )( ℎ − ℎ * )
for the ECDLP problem.
In the above forgery query, the receiver can be 0 for the signature mode; otherwise it works as signcryption. Thus, the proof is suitable for the two modes.
Analysis. Let 1 , 2 , and 3 be the events when C aborts the game.
(i) 1 is an event in which the target identity 's partial private key is queried by F . The probability of 1 is Pr 
Lemma 10. If an adversary F has nonnegligible advantage
against the EUF-CLGSC-CMA-II security of our scheme performing V Extract-Secret-Value queries and queries to oracles ( = 0, 1, 2), then there is an algorithm C that solves the ECDLP problem with probability
Proof. Given an instance of the ECDLP problem ( , ), C must find . Suppose the EUF-CLGSC-CMA-II security of the CLGSC can be violated by a forger F . C can utilize F to compute as the solution by the following interactive game.
C chooses ∈ Z * uniformly as the master key and computes = ; it sends params and to F and maintains lists (0 ≤ ≤ 2) to keep consistency between the responses to the hash queries and a list of issued keys which is initially empty.
Training Phase. F may make a series of queries and all the queries are responded to identically as those queries in the IND-CLGSC-CCA2-II game.
Forgery. Eventually, F returns a valid ciphertext from the sender to the receiver . If ̸ = , C aborts the execution of this game. It follows from the forking lemma [31] that if F is a sufficiently efficient forger in the above interaction, then we can construct another probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine F that outputs two ciphertexts ( * , , * ) and ( * , * , * ) on the same message . Thus, we can get ⋅ = + ⋅ + ℎ ⋅ + ℎ and
Therefore, C solves the ECDLP as = ( − * )( ℎ − ℎ * )
−1
(i) 1 is an event in which the target identity 's secret value is queried by F . The probability of 1 is Pr
(ii) 2 is an event in which the target identity 's private key is queried by F . The probability of 2 is Pr 
Performance Analysis
Since computation time and ciphertext size are two important factors affecting efficiency, we compare our scheme with several existing schemes in these two terms from two aspects: CLGSC-signcrypt and CLGSC-unsigncrypt. We pay attention to operations such as bilinear pairing operations, exponentiation operations, scalar multiplication operations, and hash operations. We define the notations in the Notations section and adopt the experiment testing results from [32] [33] [34] .
The comparison is shown in Table 1 ; | 1 | denotes the size of an element in 1 , | 2 | denotes the size of an element in 2 , | | denotes the length of message , | | denotes the length of identity , and | | is the size of an element in Z * .
Since the pairing and exponentiation operations require much more time than the multiplication operation, our proposed scheme is implemented without pairing and exponentiation operations. From Table 1 , it shows that our proposed CLGSC scheme requires much less computational time than the other four schemes. So, our scheme has the shortest ciphertext size and is of high efficiency too.
Conclusion
In this paper, a concrete CLGSC scheme without utilizing bilinear pairing operations is proposed, and its security is proved in the random oracle model under the ECDLP and ECDLP assumptions, including security against both an adaptively chosen ciphertext attack and an existential forgery of Type I and II adversaries. The new scheme is computationally efficient and is suitable for low power and processor devices.
Notations
Mul : Time required for executing a modular multiplication operation : Time required for executing an exponentiation ≈ 43. 
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